Shop Books. Read an excerpt of this book! Add to Wishlist. USD Sign in to Purchase Instantly. Explore Now. Buy As Gift. Overview Since the end of the Cold War, Japan's security environment has changed significantly. Show More. Average Review. Write a Review. Related Searches. Adult Biliteracy: Sociocultural and Programmatic Responses. View Product. Advances in Critical Discourse Studies. Advances in Critical Discourse Studies collects ground-breaking scholarship and cutting-edge research which reflects significant shifts Advances in Critical Discourse Studies collects ground-breaking scholarship and cutting-edge research which reflects significant shifts in Critical Discourse Studies, exploring the field from theoretical, analytic and methodological perspectives.
Such change has become increasingly noticeable in the decades since the end of the Cold War, or perhaps it is an altogether recent emergence. Modern diplomacy is in the midst of a process of change, and that rate of change is likely to approximately match the pace of general change in modern industrial societies. Such shifts in the focus of diplomatic activity raise questions about which changes in modern diplomacy will have longer term impacts, as well as if and how governments should respond to those changes.
As a matter of course, governments are always using new technical instruments. Such intervention can hinder or accelerate diplomacy, for example in the collection and processing of information. At the same time, when diplomats appear more visible to the public thanks to the digital revolution, they stand more in the shadow of other foreign policy actors.
North Korea's Human Rights Insecurity: State Image Management in the Post‐UN COI Era
In fact, professional diplomacy as a whole tends to be overshadowed at least partially by the activities of traditionally non-diplomatic actors. Digitization must be used in such a way that gains in efficiency are not made at the expense of efficacy;. At the same time, the principles of representative democracy must be kept intact; if not, the state will suffer damage to the legitimacy of its system of governance.
Otto von Bismarck, first chancellor of the German empire of , described diplomacy as the never-ending negotiation of reciprocal concessions between states. If that is the case, then today we face the question of the purpose of such a time-consuming art of managing international relations. Its insights into modern diplomacy, however, concern not only Germany. The essays in this volume from participants of the working group reflect a broad spectrum of analyses.
Changes in the structure of the international community have made continual adaptations in diplomacy tactics necessary. Additionally, new communication devices and a growing number of state and non-state actors influence foreign policy. Diplomats are bureaucrats of sorts, and certain traits of their personalities play significant roles in their specific professional activities.
Today, this social diversification, and in some ways even fragmentation, reaches far. And these are only a few examples. Andrew Cooper analyses this question further in his chapter. At the same time, decisions made at the top of the hierarchy may be adapted to what they regard as the requirements of society by civil servants even at the lower operational level. Hierarchy and bureaucratization have always been the means to restrict accumulation of power.
However, the high level of external influences besides the government or even outside of the state reduces the influence of individual diplomats. This imbalance might even threaten the democratic principle of the responsibility of governmental action. Emillie V. This burden can be quantified as the period of time available for the receipt of an item of information and subsequent consultation about it: the less time there is, the greater the pressure on the decision maker. Physical factors such as lengthy nightly conferences, travel across multiple time zones, and overloaded schedules only add to the strain.
Therefore there is a greater risk that wrong decisions will be made, not due to an erroneous comprehension of the known facts a risk always at hand given the imperfection and incompleteness of human knowledge , but because time is restricted for the processing of and reflection on facts and possible courses of action. Therefore, instead of only gathering information, diplomacy must also distil it usefully and competently. However, digital communication has to balance efficiency enhancement through increased speed, and effectiveness enhancement through calculability.
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However, they strive to promote dialogue with domestic and international publics. Therefore, modern diplomats are unavoidably under pressure to use social media. This means that they are approachable and open to public criticism via digital platforms. Social media exchange with official dialogue partners and interested publics creates a far-reaching network of connections with known and unknown, influential and powerless actors, observers, and participants.
Currently, politics must be presentable and comprehensible for many publics. The need to communicate quickly and effectively with diverse publics results in oversimplified explanations that fail to reflect the true complexities of the matters at hand. Nevertheless, in all matters that are of major concern for member states, the EU is guided by the intergovernmental working institutions. These mechanics have an impact on the diplomacy between the member states of the EU. Thus the need for global management has produced diplomacy and diplomats that represent their national interests and supranational aims at the same time.
In his chapter Hanns W. All of these attempt to influence a society or the community of states. Karsten D. Voigt analyses some of these processes in his chapter concerning the EU.
First Sino-Japanese War
Official politics is reduced to attempts to manage the situations that result from incidents outside their sphere of influence. Political participation takes place across borders, and not only in times of crises and wars. Here, foreign ministries are hardly poised to moderate negotiations anymore.
Presumably, civil society is only occasionally aware of the full impact of globalization on international events. Thus, not only politicians, but also diplomats are forced to suggest actions that promise satisfactory solutions to publics. However, civil society or other actors regularly attempt to take things into their own hands — usually through the institutionalization and organization of publics.
This sometimes makes it possible to accomplish aims that had been abandoned by traditional diplomacy. The achievements of the Paris Climate Conference in , as R. Zaharna points out, would not have been possible and the conference might not have taken place at all without the lobbying of highly active NGOs, which worked together for a long period with politicians and diplomats. Like any other form of governance, diplomacy strives to be successful. Its achievements are measured along predetermined guidelines and are judged on the value of the aims it achieved or failed to realize.
However, some parts of national publics still identify with the nation-states of the past. They expect that they will be represented by them and accept that the representation of their interests may lead to substantial conflict with other nation-states. Zaharna addresses emotionality as a determining dynamic element of foreign policy in her chapter. The question of whether the present societal and global changes will be the catalyst for homogenization or heterogenization of diplomacy remains unanswered in this volume.
At the same time, their own intellectual traditions play an additional role. As Kim B.
The role of diplomacy in the 21 st century is less clearly defined than in the past. Its influence on the organization of the international order is decreasing. An answer will eventually be determined by whether the governmental activity of democracies can gain or re-establish the indispensable trust of citizens in the representative institutions of foreign policy. Equipped with only an impressionistic body of practical knowledge about the use of economic force, diplomats from the United States and the member states of the European Union EU are struggling to keep up with an increasing reliance on ever more sophisticated economic sanctions in the pursuit of national security and foreign policy objectives.
Until now, there exists not a single official American or European doctrine that could provide guidance for the use of economic force. This intellectual imbalance can hardly be justified given that military and economic power occupy opposite sides of the same coin. This shift away from the use of armed to economic force was mainly driven by three technological and societal developments: firstly, the development of nuclear weapons led to a rapid decline of the utility of armed force, since its actual use among major powers would have assured their mutual destruction.
Later on, armed force also turned out to be a rather blunt and therefore ineffective instrument to cope with unconventional threats posed by limited or collapsing statehood, transnational violent extremism, and organized crime. This is not to say that armed forced completely ceased to be used, as the continuation of covert operations and other types of limited use of armed force such as drones or cyber warfare amply demonstrates to this day. This shift in statecraft has been most pronounced in the United States; here the Department of the Treasury now occupies a central role in foreign policy and national security policy-making, overseeing a vast regime of unilateral economic sanctions employed against state and non-state actors around the world.
Within the Department of the Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control OFAC is the lead agency that implements and enforces financial and trade sanctions under national emergency powers granted by Congress to the president pursuant to two key statutes: the Trading with the Enemy Act of and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of Every U.
Roosevelt has utilized these economic sanctions to conduct U. Under the George W. The increasing reliance on trade and financial sanctions elevated senior officials from the Department of the Treasury to pursue diplomatic missions to garner support for, and offer warnings about, non-compliance with unilateral U. Whereas the threat of being side-lined by other bureaucratic and non-state actors in the conduct of diplomacy had been feared by diplomats in the past, the current marginalization of the Department of State is truly unprecedented.
The soaring use of economic sanctions by U. This expertise mostly resided in finance or trade ministries, central banks, and the private sector. In the United States, the demand for this specialized economic knowledge has been supplied and operationalized by a new bureaucratic cast whose members are neither diplomats nor soldiers. Notwithstanding, they take on tasks that used to be assigned exclusively to diplomats, such as negotiating with foreign governments and their home companies about cooperating on the design, implementation and enforcement of economic sanctions.
The rise of these financial warriors has so far only been documented in autobiographical accounts of former protagonists. Having dethroned mercantilism as a dominant paradigm of international political economy, liberal ideas exerted a lasting impact on decision-makers, as evidenced in the words of former U. In particular, the use of economic sanctions stretches back as far as the city states of ancient Greece. In the past, scholarship overwhelmingly neglected the economic means available to diplomats.
David A. Due to their vast body of specialized and general knowledge, acquired through systematic education and training, diplomats must continue to play a central role in the design, implementation, and enforcement of economic sanctions. As Sir Robert F. A second career path with a focus on specialized training for tasks such as designing and implementing trade and financial sanctions could be a viable solution. The challenge to diplomacy for numerous Western countries has become domestic in nature.
Unlike in that earlier era, there has been no outright abandonment of international organizations IOs , as punctuated by the failure of the League of Nations. Rather than disappearing, IOs have proliferated, albeit with a bias towards informal self-selected forums including the G20 and the Financial Stability Board. In many ways, liberal internationalism continues to hold sway, at least as judged by the degree of complex interdependence. Instead of the hold of autarchy with large national champions having exclusive authority in zones of control , it is the image of hyper-globalization that defines the 21 st century.
Moreover, reflecting this kind of pluralism, it is no longer a hegemonic or unipolar era. At the core of the current dilemma is that diplomacy and its institutions are contested and stigmatized domestically by populist forces. On top of all this, of course, is the concerted challenge to contemporary diplomatic culture that U. President Donald Trump presents. On one level, to be sure, Trump can be depicted as a return to an older type of diplomacy. After all, small states were among those that experienced the heaviest diplomatic casualties of the global financial crisis. That the contested view of diplomacy and diplomats is most robust in countries at the core of the international system, is a dynamic that can only be understood in the context of a backlash against a wider segment of established institutional culture.
Foreign ministries have become more fragile in their standing across a wide spectrum of countries. Through this type of framework, therefore, it is not surprising that diplomacy and diplomats have faced challenges of even a more formidable nature beyond the West when a combination of celebrity status and populism completely captures a state.
As Serbin and Serbin Pont put it:. Changes included the modification of the Pedro Gual diplomatic academy so that professionals entering the diplomatic service would also have to do social service and experience personally the structure of the Bolivarian social missions and to acknowledge their effects on the revolution. Personalism is no longer restricted to the leaders of distinctive political parties. Even with these caveats, nonetheless, the challenge to diplomacy and foreign ministries is a serious one.
The efforts of Michael McFaul, the then U. Ambassador to Russia — , on Twitter with a following of 60,, falls into this category. Facing the challenge of populism, diplomacy and diplomats need to be far more reactive. Representation, in terms of standing and acting for others, is a core function of diplomacy. Historically, diplomats represented individual rulers; today they represent states.
Their representative role hinges on the predominance of states in international relations. Representing states diplomatically in the 21 st century is far from unproblematic. In the first part of this chapter, I will attempt to identify some contemporary and future challenging issues of state representation through diplomats.
Moreover, in the 21 st century actors other than states make claims to diplomatic representation. The diplomat is then a representative in the same sense that a flag represents a nation. Representation implies not only status standing for others but also behaviour acting for others. Principal-agent relations arise whenever one party principal delegates certain tasks to another party agent. Due to conflicting preferences and information asymmetry, agents may pursue other interests than those of the principal.
Delegation is therefore usually combined with control mechanisms, such as monitoring and audits. The proper behaviour of a representative is a matter of intense debate, especially in the literature on representative democracy. However, this is a simplification. While varying in restrictions, the instructions and bargaining mandate of diplomats often allow room for initiative within the given frames.
Diplomatic representation rests on two-way communication and mutual influence. Are there, then, specific issues of diplomatic representation in the 21 st century? Hereafter, I will identify some changes and trends, and raise questions concerning their implications. As for symbolic representation, I will discuss the change from immunity to vulnerability and the question of whether diplomats ought to mirror the society they represent. How can diplomats represent divided societies?
And what problems are associated with representing a populist regime? For centuries, the fact that diplomats represented venerable principals — from powerful monarchs to established states — guaranteed their protected and privileged status. No longer being inviolable symbols, diplomatic representatives have increasingly become highly vulnerable symbols. In a polarized world diplomats and diplomatic facilities have become soft targets for terrorist attacks. One veteran U. This raises the question of whether there are non-militarized approaches to restoring the protection and security of diplomats that have been a hallmark of diplomacy throughout centuries.
The tendency toward increasing insecurity and vulnerability not only impedes diplomatic tasks but also threatens to render the recruitment process of qualified personnel more difficult. Standing for others can be understood in another, more literal, sense.
To what extent do diplomats need to mirror the social and ethnic composition of the societies they represent? The idea that diplomats should be an accurate reflection or typical of the society they represent is quite recent. With increasing migration, many — if not most — states will have a multiethnic and multicultural character in the 21 st century. However, the question needs to be raised how important the symbolic value of accurately reflecting their society might be in the perceptions of relevant audiences. The nature of the principal is one important factor determining the nature of diplomatic representation.
And whereas democratic states place diplomats at the end of multiple chains of principals and agents, diplomats representing contemporary authoritarian states, with one clearly identifiable principal, have more restrictive mandates. We need to think harder about differing parameters of diplomatic representation between democracies and autocracies and the possible consequences of this.
The changing balance between democratic and authoritarian states in the 21 st century constitutes quite a change from the optimistic predictions of the final victory of liberal democracies after the end of the Cold War. This ought to make us think harder about differing parameters of diplomatic representation between democracies and autocracies and what consequences these might have. The use of digital platforms by autocracies for info warfare represents a new facet of 21 st century diplomacy. On the other hand, digital diplomacy offers an effective tool for democratic states to bypass the controlled media in authoritarian states.
A specific case of representation dilemmas in the 21 st century occur in divided societies. On the one hand, this would seem to grant diplomats more leeway. But, on the other hand, the lack of firm and consistent policies, standpoints and instructions complicates life for diplomats significantly. Populism yields a democratic representation problem. The U. Among U. In addition, staffs are recruited among member-state diplomats. The representational function of EU delegations is well established and EU diplomats take an active part in the local corps diplomatique.
Sceptics wonder how the two sets of career streams in the Commission and the Council Secretariat can be fused. The emergence of the EU as a diplomatic persona has not replaced, but merely added a new layer to, traditional diplomacy. Nor are there indications that other supranational entities than the EU will be granted similar diplomatic status and representation in the foreseeable future. Regions and cities are then not recognized as diplomatic personae with representation of their own. Nor are constituent states in federal governments.
However, there is an increased activity of subnational units. Today, some authors speak of a renaissance of cities as international actors. Subnational levels of federal nations constitute a special case. Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Bavaria are other examples of regional diplomatic representation. States and international institutions are engaging TNAs as policy experts, service providers, compliance watchdogs, and stakeholder representatives. Actors behind popular digital platforms, such as Google and Facebook, have a considerable political impact by how they organize our access to information.
However, in a passive way, these platforms already impact the way diplomacy is conducted as well as the international standing of diplomats. In sum, one may speak of a transnational turn in diplomacy. In this chapter, I have pointed to some, but by no means all, contemporary issues of representation. I have raised questions, but have not provided any answers. As for non-state representation, the uncertain future development of the EU will determine the significance of the supranational challenge, with no rival regional diplomatic actors in sight. The transnational challenge, on the other hand, has transformative potential by eroding the exclusive cross-border authority of states.
Representation, in sum, is best understood as a process rather than a static relationship. It is a process of mutual interaction between principals and agents. The most fascinating aspect of technological disruption is its remarkable capacity for both destruction and creation. On the other hand, by laying the groundwork for new economic or social opportunities, they also stimulate new thinking and innovative practices that reinforce and sustain these technologies in the long term.
This observation may prove particularly valuable for understanding the evolution of digital diplomacy and the extent to which the recent adoption of digital technologies by Ministries of Foreign Affairs MFAs will be able to substantially change the way in which diplomacy is practiced, or whether it will have only a marginal effect on its mode of operation. The first mega-trend actively encourages digital adoption and is driven by the dual process of rapid acceleration of technological disruption, on the one hand, and the MFAs commitment to thrive in an increasingly competitive environment, on the other hand.
The 5G technology, which is due to arrive in just a few years, will likely usher in a whole new level of technological disruption, which could lead to the mass adoption of an entire range of tech tools of growing relevance for diplomacy, such as virtual reality VR and augmented reality AR in public diplomacy or artificial intelligence in consular services.
Augmented reality AR adds digital elements to a live view often by using the camera on a smartphone. Virtual reality VR implies a complete immersion experience that shuts out the physical world. Using VR devices such as HTC Vive, Oculus Rift or Google Cardboard, users can be transported into a number of real-world and imagined environments such as the middle of a squawking penguin colony or even the back of a dragon.
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In fact, as Sandre points out, the future is already here. At the lower end of the complexity scale, chat-bots now assist with visa applications, legal aid for refugees, and consular registrations. Staying ahead of the technological curve will likely require a cognitive shift from following to anticipating and possibly pushing new trends. However, by anticipating new trends, they could better operate in an increasingly competitive digital environment and set the rules and standards of digital practice before others have the chance to do it.
For example, by mining open-source data from social media, satellite imagery and blogs, the Embers project sponsored by the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity IARPA has generated, since , highly accurate forecasts of influenza-like illness case counts, rare disease outbreaks, civil unrest, domestic political crises, and elections. DDS consists of three key layers. The first layer is demand driven and connects institutional actors, groups and stakeholders that directly benefit from digital diplomatic programs.
It may include diaspora groups in need of good digital consular services, embassies in critical spots facing public diplomacy challenges, and think tanks providing consultancy to MFAs on digital matters. The second layer is functional and task-oriented. Diplomatic engagement requires a minimum level of shared understanding and mutual openness in order to work. Such possibility arguably dissipates when emotions overwhelmingly frame and dominate the discourse by which opinions are formed online, and when facts are pushed into a secondary or marginal position.
Emotional commodification i. As the connection between emotions and social media becomes stronger and more sophisticated, the question of how digital diplomats can adapt to an emotionally charged form of social communication can no longer be ignored. In short, DEI could facilitate careful digital navigation through emotion-laden situations and steer the conversation back on a path informed by fact-based reasoning. MFAs and governments should therefore invest in the education of their staff to be better equipped to navigate this digital environment.
Recent studies have shown that up to 15 percent of Twitter accounts are in fact bots rather than people, and this number is bound to increase in the future. The Domestic Discourse and Policy Response. The Domestic Discourse and Policy Response Wilhelm M Vosse. On the domestic level, demographic change, neo-liberal economic reforms and globalization all pose a challenge to the sustainability of the current Japanese lifestyle and have led to a heightened sense of insecurity among many Japanese.
Focusing on the domestic Japanese discourse on security, this book expands the standard discussions on security that mostly focus on military security and security in international relations, to include perspectives from domestic security, economic and livelihood security, as well as sociological discussions of risk and risk manage- ment.
Governing Insecurity in Japan provides new insights into Japanese and inter- national discourses on security, as well as the ways in which security is conceptual- ized in Japan. As such, it will be of huge interest to students and scholars working on Japanese politics, security studies and international relations. Christopher W.
Hook, Julie Gilson, employment relations Christopher W. Hughes and Peter C. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. National security—Social aspects—Japan.
National security— Economic aspects—Japan. National security—Japan—Public opinion. Human security—Japan. Social psychology—Japan. Vosse, Wilhelm, author, editor of compilation.